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ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENT IN THE 
LENDING-DEPOSIT RATE SPREAD:







This study carries out an examination of the potential non-linear cointegration between 
the lending and deposit rates of eight Eastern European countries using the threshold 
models by Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001). Based upon our 
adoption in this study of the threshold error-correction model (TECM), we find solid 
evidence of an asymmetric price transmission effect between the lending and deposit 
rates. Thus, our results reveal that there are indeed such long-run non-linear 
cointegration relationships between the lending and deposit rates in these Eastern 
European countries. Furthermore, we go on to successfully capture the dynamic 
adjustment of the spread. 
Keywords:  Lending-Deposit Rates Spread, Threshold Model, Threshold Error-
Correction Model (TECM)
JEL Classification: C22, E43, G12 
1. Introduction 
The central bank usually attain to their economics target by manipulation of monetary 
market, with the implementation of its monetary policy having direct effects on the 
country’s interest rates. The transmission mechanism of such monetary policy 
includes both credit and monetary transmission pipeline mechanisms, with the 
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transmission of credit affecting the lending rate and the monetary pipeline affecting the 
deposit rate (Arden et al. 2000). When the central bank adjusts the interest rate, it 
does so in the hope that banks will simultaneously adjust their lending and deposit 
rates in order to increase the money supply into the financial market. The primary 
purpose behind the manipulation of the monetary market by the central bank is an 
attempt to achieve its target by either raising or lowering interest rates. However, both 
lending and borrowing business are the primary areas of business for the banks, and 
also one of their most important sources of stable income; therefore, when the central 
bank adjusts the interest rate, banks are unlikely to simultaneously adjust their lending 
and deposit rates.
A common phenomenon shows that when policymakers proclaim to adjust the interest 
rate, Diebold and Sharpe (1990), and Hutchison (1995) have suggested that 
banks may adjust their lending rates asymmetrically; that is, raising their lending rates 
faster when market interest rates are rising than lowering lending rates when market 
rates are declining. The range to increase of the lending rate is usually more than the 
range to decrease, that situation may let policy inefficient. In other word, downward-
sticky lending rates could lower the effect of expansionary monetary policy. This 
asymmetric relationship between lending rates and the money market rates has been 
studied extensively. For example, Cover (1992), Rhee and Rich (1995) and Karras 
(1996) have each documented the asymmetric effect of downward-sticky lending rates 
potentially minimizing the effect of an expansionary monetary policy. Furthermore, 
when relaxing the assumptions of linearity and symmetry, Arden et al. (2000) find that 
the asymmetric effects of a country’s monetary policy run in both the direction of the 
shock and the particular phase of the business cycle.
One exception is the examination of the lending and deposit rates undertaken by 
Thompson (2006), who indicated that it was only the prime lending rate which was 
found to adjust to discrepancies in the spread; indeed, banks may well set their 
lending rate according to a certain ‘mark-up’ relative to the deposit rate. However, if 
such a mark-up becomes too high or too low, the marketplace will place pressure 
upon the banking industry to adjust back to some ‘normal’ or equilibrium spread. The 
notion of equilibrium spread is supported by Ewing et al. (1998) who find stationarity in 
the spread between the prime lending and deposit rates. In specific terms, stationarity 
implies that following a shock, the spread returns will recover to their long-run 
equilibrium position. If the banks have market power, they could gain profits that are 
above the ‘norm’ simply by making downward adjustments to their lending rates at a 
slower rate than the declining deposit rates, even though such a policy may be 
regarded as unfair to the general public. Dueker (2000) nevertheless argues that banks 
are unlikely to want to be the first to lower their lending rates during cyclical downturns, 
essentially because of the higher risk of default. Thus, such risk-averse behavior by 
banks may result in lending rates adjusting asymmetrically to market rate movements.
The assumption in a number of studies, including Ho and Saunders (1981), McShane 
and Sharpe (1985) and Allen (1988) is that the variables of the spread model are 
linear and symmetrical; however, Laxton et al. (1993) prove that in those cases where 
the economic variables are non-linear and asymmetrical, any tests that are 
undertaken using linear and symmetrical methods would result in the model having 
very low power. It is, therefore, quite difficult for a linear model to capture the  Asymmetric Adjustment in the Lending-Deposit Rate Spread 
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characteristics of dynamic adjustment behavior; and indeed, if a non-linear adjustment 
relationship is found to exist, then this may produce spurious regressions (Sarno and 
Chowdhury, 2003).
In this study, we employ threshold models by Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders 
and Siklos (2001) to examine the dynamic adjustment and asymmetry to a long run 
relationship of lending-deposit rate across the Eastern European
1 countries. Enders 
and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001) indicate that nonlinear asymmetric 
threshold model can show the long-run dynamic equilibrium than traditional linear 
Error Correction Model (ECM). The aim of the present study is to use threshold 
models to determine whether a non-linear long-run relationship towards equilibrium is 
discernible in the lending-deposit spreads of the Eastern European countries; thus, 
the present empirical study contributes significantly to this field of research. We go on 
to apply asymmetric error-correction models to describe the dynamic adjustments to 
the lending-deposit spreads of these Eastern European countries, which may serve as 
a guideline for future macro policy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A discussion of the data and 
methodology adopted for this study is provided in Section 2, followed in Section 3 by 
the presentation of our empirical results. Finally, the conclusions drawn from this study 
are presented in Section 4. 
2. Methodology
The findings of the I(1) series for both lending rate (LR) and deposit rate (DR) as 
enable us to proceed with a further test for the long-run equilibrium (cointegrating) 
relationship between these two variables. On the basis of non-linearity, we employ the 
specific threshold cointegration approach proposed by Enders and Granger (1998) 
and Enders and Siklos (2001); thus, we adopt the full residual-based two-stage 
estimation, as developed by Engle and Granger (1987), with the first-stage 
cointegration equations being estimated as follows: 
t t t X Y H O O     1 0  (1) 
where Yt is the lending rate (LR), and Xt is the deposit rate (DR),  0 O  and  1 O  are the 
parameters to be estimated; and Ht is the disturbance term, which may be serially 
correlated. The existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship will involve the 
stationary of Ht. In the second stage procedure, this is given by: 
t t t u    ' 1 UH H  (2) 
where ut is the white-noise distribution, with the residuals from the regression model 
being used to estimate ǻHt . The rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
implies that the residuals in Equation (2) are stationary, with mean zero. Hence, the 
                                                          
1 Eastern European countries are included Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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long-run equilibrium relationship in Equation (1) is accepted, with symmetric 
adjustment in Equation (2). 
The standard cointegration framework, which assumes symmetrical adjustment 
towards equilibrium in Equation (2), will be misspecified if the adjustment process is 
asymmetric. A formal way of introducing asymmetric adjustment is therefore to allow 
the deviation from the long-run equilibrium in Equation (1) to behave as a ‘threshold 
autoregressive’ (TAR) process. Based upon the test for threshold cointegration 
proposed by Enders and Siklos (2001), the residuals from Equation (1) are estimated 
under the following form: 
t t t t t t u I I      '   1 2 1 1 ) 1 ( H U H U H  (3)

















where Ĳ is the threshold value.
If Ht –1  W, then It = 1, and the speed of adjustment in Equation (3) is U1; conversely, if 
Ht –1 < W , then It = 0, and the speed of adjustment is U 2. A necessary and sufficient 
condition for {Ht} to be stationary is –2<( U 1, U 2) < 0. If the value of Ht –1 is above W,
then the adjustment is U 1Ht –1, and if the value of Ht –1 is below W, then the adjustment 
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As opposed to estimating Equation (1) with the Heaviside indicator being dependent 
upon the level of Ht –1 , the decay could also be allowed to be dependent upon the 
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According to Enders and Granger (1998), this model is of particular value when the 
adjustment is asymmetric (where the series exhibits more ‘momentum’ in one 
direction than in the other). This model, which is referred to as the ‘momentum 
threshold autoregressive’ (M-TAR) model, is designed to capture ‘deep’ asymmetric 
movements in the series of deviations from long-run equilibrium; that is, it determines 
whether positive deviations are more prolonged than negative deviations. The method 
adopted by Chan (1993) can be applied to determine both the minimum value of the  Asymmetric Adjustment in the Lending-Deposit Rate Spread 
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square terms of the residual errors and the threshold value W.
2 Enders and Siklos 
(2001) propose the application of the ‘Akaike information criterion’ (AIC) and the 
‘Schwartz Bayesian information criterion’ (SBC) in order to determine the selection of 
the TAR or M-TAR model. 
Finally, we perform a number of statistical tests on the estimated coefficients in order 
to ascertain whether the variables are cointegrated, and, in such a case, whether or 
not the adjustment is symmetric. Two separate tests are proposed by Enders and 
Siklos (2001), use the F-statistic, involves a procedure for testing for the null 
hypothesis of U 1= U 2= 0 , and  use the t-statistic, requires a test for the null hypothesis 
with the largest U i = 0 between U 1 and U 2 . If the null hypothesis of no cointegration is 
rejected, then a test for the null hypothesis of U 1= U 2 can be undertaken using a 
standard F-statistic because the system is stationary. The equilibrium relationship with 
symmetric adjustment is accepted when the null hypothesis with no cointegration is 
rejected and the null hypothesis of U 1= U 2  is accepted. In this case, the Engle-
Granger (E-G) test for cointegration is a special case of Equation (3).
3. Empirical Results 
The data used in this study consist of monthly observations on the lending rate (LR), 
and the 1-month certificate of the deposit rate (DR) from 1998 to 2007. The reason we 
choice sample period is avoiding from subprime storm with the potential presence of 
structural breaks in the sample LR and DR studies. The data are collected from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). The descriptive statistics of the variables for 
each Eastern European country under examination are provided in Table 1, from 
which we can see that both the lending and deposit rates of Romania are the highest 
throughout the sample, whilst the lending and deposit rates of the Czech Republic are 
the lowest. The Jarque-Bera tests on the Eastern European countries examined in this 
study show that for all of the variables for each country, the distribution is 
approximately non-normal. 
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the variables for each country
Country
a Mean Min. Max. S.D. Skewness  Kurtosis  J-B
b
Bulgaria
LR 10.412  7.010  15.430 2.144  0.591  2.154  10.564*** 
DR  3.096 2.710 3.710 0.242  0.769  3.476  12.964*** 
Czech Republic 
LR 7.169  5.540  13.680 2.141  1.939  5.849  115.779*** 
DR  2.714 1.100 8.470 2.123  1.620  4.663  66.335*** 
                                                          
2 As a general rule, the threshold value Ĳ is unknown. The method adopted in Chan (1993) 
involves arranging the residual error terms in order, from small to large; the first and last 15 
per cent are then removed, and the middle 70 per cent are selected. The sum of the squares 
of the residual errors is then minimized prior to the value being determined. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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Country
a Mean Min. Max. S.D. Skewness  Kurtosis  J-B
b
Hungary
LR 11.869  7.000  20.300 3.541  0.814  2.753  13.545*** 
DR 9.086  3.890  16.770 3.002  0.812  2.936  13.189*** 
Poland
LR 12.495  5.430  26.900 6.683  0.534  1.872  12.067*** 
DR 7.710  2.150  19.700 5.511  0.707  2.137  13.725*** 
Romania
LR  35.361 12.920 75.600 18.184 0.402  1.879  9.514*** 
DR 20.279  4.000  52.100 14.241 0.577  1.973  11.932*** 
Russia
LR 19.482  9.200  49.000 11.896 1.232  3.095  30.388*** 
DR 6.845  3.300  27.300 5.133  2.358  8.003  236.314*** 
Slovakia
LR 11.852  6.230  23.930 5.288  1.023  2.585  21.787*** 
DR 7.140  2.250  18.570 4.534  1.081  2.861  23.453*** 
Ukraine
LR 28.906 13.310 71.520 15.886  0.909  2.595  17.340***
DR 11.458 6.140 28.220 5.728  1.308  3.426  35.123***
Notes:
a LR denotes the lending rate; and DR denotes the deposit rate of the one-month 
certificate.
b    J-B refers to the Jarque-Bera test for normality, with *** indicating significance at the 
0.01 level. 
3.1 Threshold Cointegration Tests 
For each type of asymmetry, we set the indicator function  t I  according to Equation 
(3) or Equation (4). The AIC and SBC are used to select the most appropriate lag 
length and to determine whether the adjustment mechanism is best captured as a 
TAR or M-TAR process. Widespread support is found for the method adopted by 
Chan (1993) for obtaining consistent threshold estimates with the M-TAR model, 
except Czech Republic with TAR model, as shown in Table 2. 
As shown in Table 2, In the Czech Republic case, based on AIC and SBC, the TAR 
model with the consistent estimate of the threshold is selected and the null hypothesis 
of 0 2 1     U U  is rejected at the 5% significance level, in addition the M-TAR model 
with the consistent estimate of the threshold are selected and the null hypotheses of 
0 2 1     U U  is rejected at the 1% significance level for Romania, Russia, Slovak and 
Ukraine, could be rejected at the 5% significance level for Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Poland. Asymmetric Adjustment in the Lending-Deposit Rate Spread 
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Table 2
The results of threshold cointegration tests 





 -1.042**    -0.151*** 592.537/  7.718**  6.960**  16.596 Bulgaria MTAR  1  2.799 
(-2.297) (-2.986) 600.849  (0.001)  0.010  [0.288]
  -0.412***  -0.105**  158.804/   7.744**  6.392*  3.879  Czech
Republic TAR 5  0.334  (-3.609) (-1.943) 177.957  (0.001)  (0.012)  [0.985]
  -0.145***   -0.523*** 282.979/   7.235**  3.309  11.292 Hungary MTAR  0  -0.592  (-2.76) (-2.60) 288.538  (0.001) (0.071)  [0.504]
  -0.360*** -0.006  320.012/   8.330**   12.310*** 8.924  Poland MTAR  6  0.178  (-4.070) (-0.104) 341.831  (0.001)  (0.001)  [0.709]
  -0.689*** -0.040  577.979/    13.036***  20.599*** 26.432 Romania MTAR 0  2.108  (-4.982) (-1.115) 583.538  (0.0000) (0.0000)  [0.256]
  -0.166***   -0.411*** 783.802/    9.365***  4.904  20.935 Russia MTAR  5  -0.975  (-2.599) (-3.930) 802.955  (0.000)  (0.028)  [0.702]
-0.001    -0.566*** 571.788/    15.941***  16.156*** 5.448  Slovak MTAR  1  -1.289  (-0.006) (-5.597) 580.101  (0.000)  (0.000)  [0.941]
  -0.578***   -0.257*** 900.625/    12.464*** 3.191  28.320 Ukraine MTAR  0  4.24  (-1.098) (-2.127) -157.559 (0.000)  (0.000)  [0.683]
Notes: 1. AIC=T*ln(RSS)+2*n ; and SBC=T*ln(RSS)+n*ln(T), where n = number of regressors 
and T = number of usable observations. RSS is the residual sum of squares. 
2. This test follows a non-standard distribution so the test statistics are compared with 
critical values reported by Enders and  Siklos (2001). 
3. The numbers reported in this column are F-statistics of symmetric adjustment. The 
critical values are taken from Enders and  Siklos (2001). 
4. Q(12) is the Ljung-Box Q-statistic for the joint hypothesis of no serial correlation 
among the first residuals. 
5. Entries in parentheses in this column are the t-statistics for the null hypothesis 0 1   U
and 0 2   U . Critical values reported by Enders and Siklos (2001). 
6. Numbers in brackets are p-value. 
7. The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
In addition, there is evidence that 
2 1 U U !  implying that the speed of adjustment is 
more rapid for positive than for negative discrepancies. For example, the rate of the 
Romania converges to its long-run equilibrium W  at the rate of 68.8% for a positive 
deviation and 4% for a negative deviation. It is reasonable to conclude that the spread 
of the lending-deposit rate in the Eastern European countries follow nonlinear 
adjustment and the adjustment mechanisms are asymmetric. 
3.2 Threshold Error-Correction Models 
Following the positive finding of a non-linear equilibrium relationship, we use the 
asymmetric threshold error-correction model (TECM) to capture the short-run and 
long-run dynamic adjustment process with regard to the lending rate (LR)t and the 
deposit rate (DR)t of the Eastern European countries. We apply the AIC to determine 
the appropriate lag lengths, with the estimated coefficients determining the speed of Institute of Economic Forecasting
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adjustment for positive and negative deviations from fundamental value. We specify 
and estimate the asymmetric error-correction model with regard to the lending and 
deposit rates, and the asymmetric TECM, for the case of Romania, as follows:
(7) 1 202 0 807 0 018 0 1 1 12 1 11 1
164 1
1
* * 726 3 931 0
t t t t t
) . (
t t
) . ( ) . (
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where It is the Heaviside indicator and Aij (L) is first-order polynomials in the lag 
operator L. Within the TECM, |U1| is the adjusted speed above the threshold and |U 2|
is the adjusted speed below the threshold.
The estimation results for the TECM in Equation (7) indicate that there is a much 
larger lending rate when the lending-deposit spread is widening (|U 1| =0.807), for 
example, during an economic downturn when there is a fall in the market rate, as 
compared to the response to a narrowing spread (|U 2| = 0.202), for example, during 
an economic upturn when there is a rise in the market rate. This indicates that for 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania and Ukraine, the lending rate adjusts much 
more rapidly with a widening spread than when the spread is narrowing; in other 
words, the lending rates of these countries adjust more rapidly under a declining 
market rate than under an increasing market rate.
Furthermore, for Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovakia, we find that the speed of 
adjustment in the lending rate is much more rapid under a narrowing spread than 
when the spread is widening. That is, the speed of adjustment in the lending rate for 
these countries is much more rapid when the market rate is rising, than when it is 
declining. However, we find that for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and 
Slovakia, the deposit rate adjusts more rapidly when the spread is widening than 
when it is narrowing. Furthermore, for Hungary, Romania and the Ukraine, the speed 
of adjustment is found to be much more rapid under a narrowing spread than when 
the spread is widening. All of the results of the TECM are presented in Table 3. The 
model estimated in this study can provide useful policy guidelines for the central 
banks of Eastern European countries in their attempts to establish appropriate and 
efficient monetary policies. We find that almost all of the adjustments to the term 
lending-deposit rate spreads in the Eastern European countries examined in this study 
are asymmetric.
Table 3
The results of asymmetric error correction model 
1 

t t I U 1 ) 1 ( 

 t t I U
LR 0.718(1.617)  -0.126(-2.269)**  Bulgaria
DR -0.209(-1.739)*  -0.017(-0.560) 
LR -0.390(-3.726)**  -0.062(1.164)  Czech Republic 
DR -0.077(-2.661)***  0.004(0.139) 
LR -0.011(-0.115)  -0.214(-0.682)  Hungary
DR 0.002(0.006)  -0.099(-0.914)  Asymmetric Adjustment in the Lending-Deposit Rate Spread 
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1 

t t I U 1 ) 1 ( 

 t t I U
LR -0.158(-2.189)**  -0.186(-3.346)***  Poland
DR 0.201(3.272)***  -0.133(-1.664) 
LR -0.807(-2.864)***  -0.202(-4.243)***  Romania
DR 0.105(  2.103)**  -0.542(-1.885)* 
LR -0.099(-3.086)***  -0.126(-2.516)***  Russia
DR -0.312(-5.246)***  -0.161(-1.399) 
LR -0.300(-5.036)***  -0.784(-3.195)***  Slovak
DR -1.056(-6.377)***  -0.042(-0.957) 
LR -0.197(-2.385)***  -0.127(-3.637)***  Ukraine
DR -0.142(-0.485)***  -0.262(2.614) 
Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses is t -statistic, respectively. 
2. The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
The motivation for the examination of such non-linearity can be found in policy-
orientated explanations, within which central bank intervention takes place only when 
the economy deviates from equilibrium by a sufficient amount; thus, the nature of such 
policy action may differ depending upon the sign of disequilibrium, with central banks 
paying more attention to rising interest rates than falling rates due to their diverse 
implications. Furthermore, market-orientated explanations could also provide a 
rationale for non-linear dynamics, where market agents, such as arbitrageurs, may 
enter the market only if the deviation from no-arbitrage equilibrium is sufficiently large 
to compensate them for market friction, such as transaction costs, the bid-ask spread, 
short-selling and borrowing constraints, as well as the risk arising from the interaction 
with noise trading. It is argued that any persistent asymmetry in the short-term 
lending-deposit spread will result in inefficient monetary policy, ultimately leading to a 
failure to achieve policy targets. Thus, if the central banks of these Eastern European 
countries wish to make their monetary policy more efficient, they must create the 
necessary symmetry in the lending-deposit spread; this is why the stable long-run 
relationship between the lending and deposit rates serves as an appropriate guideline 
for macro policy. 
4. Conclusions 
The primary aim of this study is to empirically examine the long-run equilibrium 
relationships that exist between the lending-deposit spreads of the eight Eastern 
European countries using threshold models developed by Enders and Granger (1998) 
and Enders and Siklos (2001). The adoption of this methodology provides much 
stronger evidence of these long-run non-linear equilibrium relationships. Furthermore, 
the asymmetric TECM also indicates that the lending rate adjusts to discrepancies in 
the spread for virtually all of the Eastern European countries examined in this study. 
The evidence presented in this study of asymmetric adjustment in the spread provides 
clear support for the hypothesis that banks are very quick to adjust their lending rates 
when the spread is widening (for example, during a period of economic downturn 
when there is a fall in the market rate) and may also help to explain the diverse effects Institute of Economic Forecasting
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that monetary policy is found to have on output. The estimated model in this study can 
provide useful policy guidelines for the central banks of these Eastern European 
countries in their attempts to achieve much greater spread stability, and a narrowing 
of the divergence between the lending and deposit rates. The policy implications of 
our empirical results are the potential achievement of efficiency within a market 
economy.
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